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Jul 06 2014

Bill Whittle: Losing the Peace in Iraq

We didn’t lose the Vietnam War. We lost the Vietnam Peace. We lost it not to communists in Vietnam, but to liberals in the governmedia. History is repeating itself with Iraq:

By now it should be obvious that America has only one real enemy, and it isn’t communists or Muslims, either of which we could handle easily if not for the enemy within.

On a tip from Stormfax.



20 Responses to “Bill Whittle: Losing the Peace in Iraq”

  1. grayjohn says:

    Democrats are why farts smell bad. When they win, decency loses. Freedom loses.
    Liberty loses. Asshole democrats.

  2. grayjohn says:

    Democrats are why farts smell bad. When they win, decency loses. Freedom loses.
    Liberty loses. Asshole democrats.

  3. Mr. Mentalo says:

    Whittle is awesome. A true voice of sanity, but sadly crying in the wilderness.

  4. Mr. Mentalo says:

    Whittle is awesome. A true voice of sanity, but sadly crying in the wilderness.

  5. Rex Kwon Do says:

    Dave, spell check: piece, peace. First full sentence.

    Apologies.

  6. Taters...mmhmmm says:

    Dave, spell check: piece, peace. First full sentence.

    Apologies.

  7. F.D.R. in Hell says:

    Dave might be referring to Jane Fonda. “Vietnam piece”

  8. F.D.R. in Hell says:

    Dave might be referring to Jane Fonda. “Vietnam piece”

  9. feralcat says:

    An excerpt from the U.S. Army War College Quarterly – Winter
    1996-1997: “The leaders of the United States in the crucial years of the
    early and mid-1960s failed to come up with a strategy that would
    produce victory. Instead, they simply poured in more and more US troops
    and materiel into South Vietnam. They misled the public by insisting we
    were winning the war and thereby prepared the war for defeatism and
    demagoguery later on. The American people could not be expected to
    continue indefinitely to support a war in which they were told victory
    was around the corner, but which required greater and greater effort
    without any obvious signs of improvement.

    Norman Podhoretz, who believes that American intervention in the Vietnam War was “an attempt born of noble ideals and impulses,” has concluded that “the
    only way the United States could have avoided defeat in Vietnam was by
    staying out of the war altogether.”
    His judgment, in retrospect, appears to be as reasonable as any. The United States intervened in the Vietnam War on behalf of a weak and incompetent ally, and it pursued a conventional military victory against a wily, elusive, and extraordinarily determined opponent who shifted to ultimately decisive conventional military operations only after inevitable American political exhaustion undermined potentially decisive US military responses. Even had the United States attained a conclusive
    military decision, its cost would have exceeded any possible benefit. Vietnam was then, and remains today, a strategic backwater
    , and the US decision to fight there in the 1960s was driven by a doctrine of containing communism that in the 1950s was witlessly militarized and indiscriminately extended to all of Asia.
    Bernard Brodie observed in the early 1970s that “it is now clear what we mean by calling the United States intervention in Vietnam a failure. We mean that at least as early as the beginning of 1968 even the most favorable outcome could not remotely be worth the price we would have paid for it.”
    *
    *
    *
    “The [Vietnam] war was only made possible through lies and deceptions aimed at the American public, Congress, and members of Lyndon Johnson’s own administration. Contrary to Robert McNamara’s claims of ignorance and overconfidence during the period 1963-1965, the record proves that he and others were men who not only should have known better, but who did know better. These men and the decisions they made during those crucial
    months mired the United States in a costly war that could not be won at a
    cost acceptable to the American public”

    – H.R. McMaster,
    author of “Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.” graduated from
    West Point in 1984. He has taught at West Point and received his Ph.D.
    in military history from the University of North Carolina in 1996.

  10. FeralCat says:

    An excerpt from the U.S. Army War College Quarterly – Winter
    1996-1997: “The leaders of the United States in the crucial years of the
    early and mid-1960s failed to come up with a strategy that would
    produce victory. Instead, they simply poured in more and more US troops
    and materiel into South Vietnam. They misled the public by insisting we
    were winning the war and thereby prepared the war for defeatism and
    demagoguery later on. The American people could not be expected to
    continue indefinitely to support a war in which they were told victory
    was around the corner, but which required greater and greater effort
    without any obvious signs of improvement.

    Norman Podhoretz, who believes that American intervention in the Vietnam War was “an attempt born of noble ideals and impulses,” has concluded that “the
    only way the United States could have avoided defeat in Vietnam was by
    staying out of the war altogether.”
    His judgment, in retrospect, appears to be as reasonable as any. The United States intervened in the Vietnam War on behalf of a weak and incompetent ally, and it pursued a conventional military victory against a wily, elusive, and extraordinarily determined opponent who shifted to ultimately decisive conventional military operations only after inevitable American political exhaustion undermined potentially decisive US military responses. Even had the United States attained a conclusive
    military decision, its cost would have exceeded any possible benefit. Vietnam was then, and remains today, a strategic backwater
    , and the US decision to fight there in the 1960s was driven by a doctrine of containing communism that in the 1950s was witlessly militarized and indiscriminately extended to all of Asia.
    Bernard Brodie observed in the early 1970s that “it is now clear what we mean by calling the United States intervention in Vietnam a failure. We mean that at least as early as the beginning of 1968 even the most favorable outcome could not remotely be worth the price we would have paid for it.”
    *
    *
    *
    “The [Vietnam] war was only made possible through lies and deceptions aimed at the American public, Congress, and members of Lyndon Johnson’s own administration. Contrary to Robert McNamara’s claims of ignorance and overconfidence during the period 1963-1965, the record proves that he and others were men who not only should have known better, but who did know better. These men and the decisions they made during those crucial
    months mired the United States in a costly war that could not be won at a
    cost acceptable to the American public”

    – H.R. McMaster,
    author of “Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.” graduated from
    West Point in 1984. He has taught at West Point and received his Ph.D.
    in military history from the University of North Carolina in 1996.

  11. feralcat says:

    Iraq is not worth anymore American blood or treasurer. It never was..It is America’s border that needs American defending, not that of some muslim craphole.

  12. FeralCat says:

    Iraq is not worth anymore American blood or treasurer. It never was..It is America’s border that needs American defending, not that of some muslim craphole.

  13. TED says:

    O-butthead has already told them the outcome…time to go.

  14. TED says:

    O-butthead has already told them the outcome…time to go.

  15. TED says:

    AND THAT would NOT be piece of a$$. It wouold be POS.

  16. TED says:

    AND THAT would NOT be piece of a$$. It wouold be POS.


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